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I. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, the federal government’s jurisdiction over crime has 
vastly increased.
1
  Relying on an expansive interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause, Congress criminalized a variety of activities, broadening the scope 
of federal crime into areas historically left to the States.
2
  Today, federal 
criminal laws act as a supplement to many state criminal laws. 
Consequently, a significant amount of criminal conduct is subject to federal 
as well as state prosecution, which increases the potential for successive or 
dual prosecutions.
3
   
                                                                                                     
 1. See Greg Hollon, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover, 31 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 499, 499 (1996) (explaining how Congress has relied on an 
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause to criminalize “a variety of activities 
traditionally considered to be purely state matters.”).  
 2. See James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The 
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1795, 1796 (1994) (“The Commerce Clause has become, in recent years, the 
foundation for an expanding federal criminal jurisdiction over intrastate activities, on the 
theory that such activities ‘affect interstate commerce.’”).  
 3. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 
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The federalization of crime has brought about significant changes in 
the way state and federal officials implement the criminal laws.
4
  
Historically, the federal government’s involvement in crime was confined 
to enumerated areas of special federal concern.
5
 Federal and state law 
enforcement operated in distinct fields and had little interaction with one 
another—a stark contrast to today’s reality of concurrent federal and state 
jurisdiction over many crimes.
6
 Concurrent criminal jurisdiction has 
resulted in extensive interaction between state and federal authorities within 
the criminal process.
7
 This federal-state collaboration has been described as 
the “age of ‘cooperative federalism’, where the Federal and State 
governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal 
activity.”
8
 While cooperation between the two sovereigns can have many 
benefits, this Note will focus on an undesirable consequence of the 




A cross-designated prosecutor is usually a state prosecutor cross-
designated as a Special Assistant United States Attorney (“SAUSA”) to 
prosecute federal crimes.
10
 The prosecutor retains his position as a state 
prosecutor while acting as a SAUSA, effectively placing the prosecutorial 
power of both sovereigns in a single government actor.
 11
  This 
                                                                                                     
S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 738 n.7 (1997) (noting that “federalization of criminal law increases 
opportunities for successive federal prosecutions . . . .”). 
 4. See Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 
(discussing the change in the criminal process brought about by the federalization of crime 
and noting that the relations between federal and state are cooperative rather than 
independent).  
 5. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 
W. VA. L. Rev. 789, 790 (1996) (“The United States Constitution granted relatively little 
criminal law enforcement authority to the newly created federal government . . . .”).  
 6. See Braun, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining that the federalization of crime and the 
increasing cooperative interaction between federal and state law enforcement efforts are 
closely related). 
 7. Id.   
 8. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1964).  
 9. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 168–69 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Of 
course, cooperation between federal and state authorities in law enforcement is to be desired 
and encouraged . . . .”). 
 10. Federal prosecutors can also be cross-designated to conduct state prosecutions but 
this occurs less frequently.  
 11. Victoria L. Killion, No Points for the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role of Special 
Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 789, 791 (2009) (“Additionally, state prosecutors may be ‘cross-designated’ 
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centralization of power is the very danger that the Framers sought to protect 
against.
12
  The concentration of power and authority possessed by a cross-
designated prosecutor poses a substantial danger to the liberties and 
interests of criminal defendants. This danger has been often overlooked or 
disregarded in favor of more efficient crime control measures. The desire of 
politicians and law enforcement personnel to appear “tough on crime” has 
placed efficiency concerns at the forefront of the criminal process while 
pushing attention to the individual liberties of the accused into the 
background.  
Many have argued that cross designation is just a part of a bigger 
problem in our criminal justice system: allowing dual and successive 
prosecutions during the age of cooperative federalism. However, courts 
have summarily rejected broad challenges to dual or successive 
prosecutions.
13
  The purpose of this Note is to narrow the focus of the 
argument to issues arising when the same prosecutor is allowed to use the 
same evidence to prosecute a defendant in separate sovereigns. Addressing 
this problem and implementing measures to curtail its practice will afford 
criminal defendants protection from abuses of prosecutorial power and 
manipulation of the criminal process.  
The cross-designated prosecutor has been described as a “double-
edged sword.”
14
 The assurance of more efficient, enhanced attacks on crime 
is moderated by the acceptance of responsibility in preventing unfair and 
costly multiple prosecutions.
15
 So long as the prosecution uses the 
resources, procedures, and investigative tools gained through the joint 
venture fairly and properly, there is no cause for concern. However, the 
very existence of this model of prosecution presents an invitation to 
manipulate the criminal process to gain an advantage over the accused. As 
one commentator observed, “. . . cross-designation—with its sharing of 
cooperative witnesses, mutual disclosure of grand jury testimony and 
general enhancement of prosecutive cases by cooperating sovereigns—the 
                                                                                                     
as SAUSAs, allowing them to retain their positions while trying cases in federal court.”). 
 12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing 
the importance of maintaining proper checks and balances and separation of power within 
the government in order to avoid a concentration of power that would threaten the rights of 
the people).  
 13. See infra note 25. 
 14. Terry J. Knoepp & Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Creation of the Cross Designated 
Prosecutor Concept, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 155, 174 (1976–78).  
 15. Id.  
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defendants can be placed in the unfortunate position of potentially 
defending two successive cases essentially produced by the same 
prosecutors, who are cross-designated and thus given two bites of the same 
apple.”
16
 Because of the great potential for abuse that accompanies this 
centralization of prosecutorial power, I argue that a cross-designated 
prosecutor should not be allowed to prosecute the same criminal defendant 
in separate jurisdictions. 
Part I of this Note will focus on the present state of the criminal justice 
system, specifically the internal policies of the Department of Justice and 
State Attorneys General allowing individual prosecutors to represent both 
the Federal and State governments against a single defendant. Part II 
describes the various harms resulting from this system, specifically those 
undermining fundamental principles of federalism, those threatening the 
civil liberties of individual defendants, and those threatening the efficiency 
and legitimacy of the Court in the criminal justice system. Part III 
introduces proposed remedies to the system, with suggestions for Federal 
and State Executive Branches, Federal and State Legislatures, and 
individual defendants seeking judicial redress for those harms that can arise 
in criminal proceedings. 
II. The Centralized Prosecution System 
A. Appointment of SAUSAs  
In response to federal budget cuts, the Department of Justice has been 
appointing an ever-increasing number of SAUSAs to assist with their 
caseload.
17
 No federal or state statutory authority currently exists that 
authorizes the creation of a cross-designated prosecutor position.
18
 Instead, 
a cross-designated prosecutor is created by the utilization of the Attorney 
General’s appointment powers.
19
  Federal law authorizes the appointment 
of SAUSAs to assist U.S. Attorneys in preparation and prosecution of 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Joel Cohen, “Cross-Designation” of Prosecutors: They Shouldn’t Have it 
Both Ways, NAT’L L.J. 1, 36 (1987). 
 17. See Christie Thompson, To Cope with Sequester, Justice Department Staffs 
Unpaid Attorneys, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/to-cope-with-sequester-justice-department-staffs-unpaid-
attorneys (describing unpaid SAUSAs as a practical solution to growing budget pressure). 
 18.  . See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 157. 
 19. Id.   




 Once appointed, a SAUSA has the same power and 
authority as an Assistant United States Attorney.
21
 A state or local 
prosecutor can be “cross-designated” as a SAUSA, thus allowing that 
person to retain his or her position as a state prosecutor while trying cases 
in federal court.
22
  This practice allows for dual or successive prosecutions 
in state and federal jurisdictions by a single prosecutor.
23
 Moreover, it 
allows for simultaneous federal and state prosecutions by a single 




B. Challenges to Cross-Designated Prosecutors Have Been Unsuccessful 
Due to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
Dual and successive prosecutions have been frequently challenged as 
violative of a defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.
25
  These 
claims have been largely unsuccessful because of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.
26
  The doctrine stems from the common law notion that crime is 
an offense against the sovereign.
27
  The premise of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine is that state and federal jurisdictions are two separate sovereignties 
                                                                                                     
 20. See 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (2012) (“The Attorney General may appoint attorneys to 
assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires . . . .”). 
 21. See AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., Cross-Designation & Federal Firearms 
Laws: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know 5 (2003) (explaining chain of command of 
SAUSAs). 
 22. Id.  
 23. See United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182–83 (noting the “troubling” 
circumstances present, including that the same state prosecutor was responsible for both 
state and federal prosecutions). 
 24. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (explaining that under our 
federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions against a defendant).  
 25.  See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 (1985); United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 315–16 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189–90 
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122 (1959); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 
1310, 1312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 
561, 564–65 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Humphrey v. United States, 481 U.S. 1006 
(1987); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
946 (1980). 
 26.  Id.  
 27. Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290 (1992).  
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that derive their power from different sources.
28
  Thus, where a single act 
violates both state and federal criminal prohibitions, the act gives rise to 
two separate offenses: one against the state and one against the United 
States.
29
 This doctrine justifies reprosecution by state authorities of 
defendants tried before federal courts, reprosecution of federal authorities 
of defendants tried before state courts, and reprosecution by state 
authorities of defendants tried before the courts of another state.
30
  The 
doctrine also allows concurrent prosecution in state and federal court.
31
 The 
dual sovereignty doctrine bars challenges to dual or successive prosecutions 
even when a cross-designated prosecutor conducts both prosecutions.  
1. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
The dual sovereignty doctrine has been long embraced by the Supreme 
Court, beginning with United States v. Lanza.
32
  In Lanza, the Court relied 
on the dual sovereignty doctrine and held that, “an act denounced as a crime 
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and 
dignity of both and may be punished by each.”
33
  The doctrine was further 
solidified in Bartkus v. Illinois
34
 and Abbate v. United States.
35
  In Bartkus, 
a federal jury acquitted Bartkus of robbing a federally insured bank.
36
  
Disappointed in their failure to obtain a conviction, the federal authorities 
instigated reprosecution of Bartkus by Illinois authorities under a state 
robbery statute.
37
  The federal authorities prepared the state case, guided the 
state prosecution, and postponed the sentencing of Bartkus’ alleged co-
perpetrators until they testified against Bartkus at the state trial.
38
  In 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 281–82.   
 31. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Likewise 
under our federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions where 
similar or identical offenses under the two systems of law are committed as the result of 
particular conduct on the part of a defendant.”). 
 32. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).   
 33. .  Id. at 382.   
 34. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) 
 35. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).  
 36. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121, 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 164–67.  
 38. Id.  
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January 1954, after being tried in state court on substantially the same facts, 
he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
39
 The Supreme Court 
affirmed his conviction, relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, and held 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit prosecution by state 
authorities of a person who had been previously subjected to federal 
prosecution for the same offense.
40
  That same day, the Court heard Abbate 
v. United States, which challenged the propriety of allowing a federal 
prosecution for conspiracy to destroy federal property following a state 
prosecution for conspiracy to destroy the property of another.
41
 The Court 
reasoned that because the state and federal governments are separate 
sovereigns, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit prosecution by 
federal authorities of a person who had been subjected previously to state 
prosecution for the same offense.
42
 
2.  An “Exception” to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
In Bartkus, the Court suggested in dicta an exception to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine: the dual sovereignty doctrine would not bar 
successive prosecutions where “the state prosecution was a sham and a 
cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal 
prosecution,” and vice versa.
43
  The Bartkus Court did not specify the level 
of intergovernmental collusion or cooperation necessary to fall within the 
exception, nor has it done so since.
44
 Indeed, as Justice Brennan’s dissent 
points out, the facts of Bartkus itself suggest the difficulty of establishing 
the exception.
45
 The exception has been described as “illusory” while many 
jurisdictions have questioned whether the exception exists at all.
46
  Courts 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).  
 41. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188–89 (1959). 
 42. Id. at 194–95.  
 43. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1959).  
 44. See Thomas White, Limitations Imposed on the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine by 
Federal and State Governments, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 173, 183 (2011).  
 45. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot see how there can 
be more complete federal participation in a state prosecution than there was in this 
case . . . . If this state conviction is not overturned, then, as a practical matter, there will be 
no restraints on the use of state machinery by federal officers to bring what is in effect a 
second federal prosecution.”). 
 46. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 296 (“The sham prosecution exception is more than 
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have made clear that mere “cooperation between prosecutorial 
sovereignties” is insufficient to meet the exception.
47
  This is true even 
when the circumstances of the case strongly suggest a sham prosecution 
such as where: (1) state sovereigns requested federal prosecution, (2) the 
initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the second, and (3) cross 
designations of state officials as federal officials were made.
48
  
Many have discussed the ineffectiveness of the exception and its utter 
failure to prevent unjust outcomes.
49
 Around the time the dual sovereignty 
doctrine was established, the risk of successive federal-state prosecutions 
was not a substantial concern as the practice was very rare.
50
 However, that 
changed with the dramatic expansion of federal criminal law. Before the 
federalization of criminal law, reality supported the dual sovereignty 
doctrine’s portrayal of two independent sovereigns.
51
 Today, cooperation 
between the federal and state governments is a regular and, in some areas—
such as the execution of criminal firearms and narcotics laws—pervasive 
feature of the modern American criminal justice system.
52
  
C.  Cross-Designated Prosecutors Are a Result of the Transformation of 
Our Criminal Justice System 
                                                                                                     
narrow, it is illusory.”); see also United States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244, 247 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1987) (noting that the Bartkus Court “did not squarely address the issue of whether, if 
substantiated by the record, a ‘sham’ situation would constitute an exception to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine.”). 
 47. There was extensive cooperation in Bartkus but the Court declined to question 
whether it was a “sham prosecution.” Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see 
also United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bernhardt, 
831 F.2d 181, 182–83 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Angelton, 314 F.3d 767, 773–74 (5th 
Cir. 2002).  
 48. See White, supra note 44, at 186. 
 49. See, e.g., Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal 
Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1309 (1997); see also David L. Lane, Twice Bitten: Denial of the Right to Counsel in 
Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1869, 1882 (2009) 
(describing the “sham prosecution” exception as flawed or nonexistent).  
 50. See Braun, supra note 4, at 6 (“For Alphonse Bartkus and Louis Abbate, the 
danger was all too real, but the practice was still rare.”). 
 51. Id. at 7 (explaining that before the federalization of crime, state and federal law 
enforcement officials operated in separate and distinct fields with little or no interaction). 
 52. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 297 (discussing the joint efforts of state and federal 
law enforcement in the “war on drugs”).  
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1.  The Federalization of Crime and the Resulting System of Cooperative 
Federalism 
The ever-popular political desire to appear tough on crime has “fueled 
an enormous growth in the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction 
over crime and in the resources allotted to federal law enforcement and 
prosecution.”
53
 Since the 1960s, Congress has passed sweeping crime 
control measures, resulting in concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over 
many crimes. Thus, the landscape of the criminal justice system 
transformed from two sovereigns enforcing their criminal laws separately 
and independently to increasing collaboration between federal-state 
officials acting together to enforce the criminal laws.
54
 This practice of 
national, state, and local governments interacting cooperatively and 
collectively to solve common problems has been termed “cooperative 
federalism.”
 55
 The tendency, particularly in large urban areas, was to 
formalize collaborative relationships between federal, state and local 
agencies through joint task forces and a variety of special programs.
56
  The 




The federalization of crime and emergence of cooperative federalism 
has significantly weakened the justifications for allowing dual or successive 
prosecutions. Many have argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine has no 
place in the age of cooperative federalism because the rationale behind the 
dual sovereignty doctrine can only stand if the two sovereigns are actually 
separate and independent.
58
  Indeed, in other areas of criminal law—such as 
                                                                                                     
 53. Hollon, supra note 1, at 537.  
 54. See Braun, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining how the proliferation of federal criminal 
legislation has changed the way the criminal law is executed by state and federal officials).  
 55. Id. at 8.  
 56. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 
34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 397 (2006) (describing the collaborative relationships involved in 
joint task forces). 
 57. Nora V. Demleitner, The Federalization of Crimes and Sentencing, 11 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 123, 125  (1998) (“Frequently state and federal prosecutors . . . are cross-
designated to allow them to work in both systems.”).  
 58. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 296–97; Braun, supra note 4, at 71–72; see also 
Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in 
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1540–50 (1967); Ray C. Stoner, Double Jeopardy and 
Dual Sovereignty: A Critical Analysis, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 946, 955–58 (1970); see 
also United States v. Grimes 641 F.2d 96, 101–104 (1981); see also United States v. All 
Assets G.P.S., 66 F.3d 483,496–99 (1995). 
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compelled testimony and sharing illegally obtained evidence—the courts 




Because there have been numerous works exploring the implications 
that cooperative federalism has on dual sovereignty, I will not be focusing 
on cooperative federalism and dual sovereignty as a whole. The focus of 
this Note is much narrower and more amenable to resolution: the harm that 
arises when the structural protections of sovereign independence become 
meaningless when federal and state power unite in one prosecutor. 
III.  Dangers Inherent in Centralized Prosecution 
A. Prosecutorial Power 
In our criminal justice system, the prosecutor possesses broad 
discretion and wide-ranging powers.
60
  No public official has a greater 
direct impact on the individual citizen than the prosecutor in a criminal 
case.
61
 As one scholar stated, “overreaching and the resulting miscarriages 
of justice are dangers built into the very structure of governmental power 
and prosecutions in criminal cases.”
62
 Another explained, “[c]oncurrent 
jurisdiction due to the federalization of criminal law introduces a potential 
for prosecutorial abuse that was not an area of concern when crime was 
primarily a locally regulated phenomenon.”
63
 The expansion of crimes and 
resulting increases in punishment has effectively transferred the power to 
make and adjudicate laws to prosecutors.
64
 The overlap of federal and state 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) 
(noting an interaction of state and federal officials in a “united front against many types of 
criminal activity,” the Court acknowledged that the institutional interests safeguarded by a 
system of dual sovereignties had been partially superseded by a structure of cooperative 
federalism); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960) (outlining the 
silver-platter doctrine and finding that evidence that is illegally obtained by state law 
enforcement officers is no longer admissible in a federal prosecution). 
 60. See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double 
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 887 (1998). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 957. 
 63. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1313.  
 64. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004) (“The law-on-the-street—the law that 
determines who goes to prison and for how long—is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by 
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criminal laws and procedures creates even more opportunity for abuse of 
discretion on the part of the cross-designated prosecutor.
65
 The practice of 
cross-designation affords the prosecutor unfettered authority to make 
charging decisions, strike plea deals, impose sentences, and manipulate 
otherwise independent sovereigns in securing a conviction.
66
 Cross 
designation has been criticized as resulting in the manipulation of federal 




Most of the challenges involving cross-designated prosecutors have 
been double jeopardy claims premised on the Bartkus exception to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine.
68
  Every circuit to consider the issue has held that the 
cross-designation of a state district attorney as a federal official to assist or 
even to conduct a federal prosecution does not by itself bring a case within 
the Bartkus exception.
69
 Even when the facts suggest substantial control of 
one sovereign over the other by use of a cross-designated prosecutor, courts 
have declined to apply the exception.
70
   
B.  Centralized Prosecution Is Inconsistent with Principles of Federalism 
                                                                                                     
legislators or judges.”).  
 65. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1326. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395 n.15 
(1992). 
 68. See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 
893 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 69. Id.   
 70. See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.1991) (noting 
that the state prosecuted at the request of federal authorities; federal agents testified and sat 
at the state prosecutor’s table; federal evidence provided to the state; federal agent prepared 
key state witnesses; SAUSAs salary as federal prosecutor paid by the state); United States v. 
Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir.1990) (noting that DEA was actively involved in the state 
investigation and arrest; state prosecutor was designated as SAUSA for federal prosecution); 
United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that after the state 
court judge granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the state prosecutor, Dirks, 
filed a nolle prosse and federal authorities indicted defendant and appointed Dirks as a 
SAUSA for purposes of federal prosecution).  But cf. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 
666 (W.D. Va. 1991) (finding that there was substantial control of one sovereign over the 
other by use of a cross-designated SAUSA).  
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The model of centralized prosecution that results from cross-
designating prosecutors is inconsistent with the principles of federalism 
upon which our Nation was founded.
71
 The Framers divided authority 
between the federal and state governments for the benefit of the American 
people.
72
 This was to “prevent any distortion of the balance of power that in 
turn would subject the people to a tyrannous federal government.”
73
 In 
allocating power between the state and federal governments and placing 
sovereignty in the hands of the people, the Framers were not only motivated 
by a size-of-government concern, but also a concern with protecting 
individual liberty.
74
 Government officials became representatives or agents 
of the people—the government’s power derived from the sovereignty of the 
people.
75
 The rationale for separating the government into independent 
federal and state spheres is explained in James Madison’s The Federalist 
No. 51:  
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the 
portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. 
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself.
76
 
The Supreme Court echoed this in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
77
 reasoning 
that in the same way that “separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed 
Constitutional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 
851, 854 (2006) (explaining that federalism refers to the sharing of power between two 
levels of government). 
 72. See id. at 856 (“This division of authority between the state and federal 
governments, with the latter enjoying only limited, enumerated powers, was not created for 
the benefit of the states but for the benefit of the American people.”). 
 73. Id.   
 74. See Garry, supra note 71, at 852 (noting that the Framers believed that federalism 
would help ensure individual liberty by limiting and monitoring the power of the 
government). 
 75. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1435–
36 (1987).  
 76. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
 77. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (finding that Congressional 
interference with the state’s decision to establish qualifications for judges upsets the usual 
constitutional balance of federal and state powers).  
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excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and 
abuse from either front.”
78
  Hence, the Federalists consciously designed a 
dual-agency governance structure in which each set of government agents 
would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other’s compliance with 
the Constitution’s protections of individual rights and liberties.
79
 Thus, 
federalism promotes limited government and limited government, in turn, 




1.  Centralized Prosecution Results in a Breakdown of Federalism and its 
Protections 
By diffusing power and limiting government in a manner analogous to 
the separation of powers, federalism is one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty.
81
 As one scholar explains:  
A diverse and decentralized governmental structure divided between the 
layers of state, local and nation, offers an array of benefits, the most 
compelling of which is the protection of individual liberty. The 
Constitution’s embodiment of the structural principles of federalism is 
designed not just to create a workable government but to create one that 
protects individual rights. Federalism works with . . . the separation of 
powers to produce a system with two different levels of checks and 
balances: one existing between the national and state governments, and 
the other between the three branches of federal government. This system 




Federalism was intended to give the governments, state and national, 
incentives to win the sovereign people’s affections by “monitoring and 
challenging the other’s misdeeds.”
83
 However when the state and federal 
government unite to prosecute a single criminal defendant, there is no one 
                                                                                                     
 78. Id.   
 79. See Amar, supra note 75, at 1427.   
 80. See id.  
 81. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (explaining that the separation of 
state and federal government into separate spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty). 
 82. Garry, supra note 71, at 873–74.  
 83. Amar, supra note 75, at 1450. 
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to challenge the other’s misdeeds. Thus, the lack of any meaningful check 
substantially increases the potential for abuse of power and unconstitutional 
infringement upon a defendant’s rights.  
“Far from seeking to create an indivisible central organ to wield all 
national power, the Federalists labored to divide power among distinct 
agencies.”
84
 By diluting the power of the centralized national government, 
federalism effectively limits opportunities for abuse. The breakdown of 
federalism occurring as a result of cooperative federalism and, more 
specifically, cross-designated prosecutors, has dire consequences for the 
criminally accused.  
To the Framers, “the primary safeguards against government tyranny 
were architectural.”
85
 Infringements on liberty caused by a potentially 
tyrannical national government could best be prevented by state 
governments standing “ready to rally their citizens and lead them into 
opposition.”
86
  But overreaching by one government cannot be prevented by 
the other when the two are joined together. This concentration of power—
concentration of both state and federal prosecutorial power in a single 
prosecutor—was exactly what the Framers intended to prevent. This is 
evidenced by James Madison’s The Federalist No. 47 where he stated, 
“[t]he accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
87
 In separating and dividing 
power, either horizontally or vertically, the Federalists believed that 
individual liberties would be protected by vesting power in different sets of 
agents who will have personal incentives to observe and enforce limitations 
on each other’s powers.
88
 
Federalism and its constitutionally guaranteed protection of liberty is 
completely destroyed when federal and state prosecutorial powers are 
vested in an individual government actor. Absent federalism’s protection 
from a centralized governmental authority, the individual criminal 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 1442. 
 85. Garry, supra note 71, at 875–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Id.  
 87. See Amar, supra note 75, at 1442 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47) (this refers to 
the separation of powers, but the argument for federalism is analogous). 
 88. Id. at 1427 (“Guided by emerging principles of agency law and organization 
theory, the Federalists consciously designed a dual-agency governance structure in which 
each set of government agents would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other’s 
compliance with the corporate charter established by the People of America.”).  
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2. This Breakdown In Federalism Impermissibly Increases A Cross-
Designated Prosecutor’s Power and Discretion 
In many American jurisdictions, the prosecutor is the criminal justice 
system.
90
 Prosecutors effectively make the law, enforce it against particular 
individuals, and adjudicate their guilt and resulting sentences.
91
 Former 
U.S. Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice, Robert H. Jackson, 
explained the potential for abuse inherent in prosecutorial power: 
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than 
any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. . . . If the 
prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose 
his defendants. . . . It is in this realm in which the prosecutor picks some 
person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group 
of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest 




The model of centralized prosecution that occurs by the utilization of 
cross-designated prosecutors lacks any meaningful checks that would 
prevent these abuses.  Unlike the system envisioned by the Framers where 
the Constitution provides “double security” for individual rights, neither 
federalism nor the separation of powers principle provides any checks upon 
this power. When the State and Federal governments join forces, as they do 
in cross-designated prosecutors, the “two sovereigns in effect act as one 
sovereign; that they represent two governments becomes insignificant.”
93
  
                                                                                                     
 89. See Garry, supra note 71, at 855 (emphasizing federalism as a structural protection 
necessary for the preservation of democracy and individual rights).   
 90. See Erik Luna & Marianna Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1413, 1415 (2010). 
 91. See id.  
 92. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General of United States, The Federal Prosecutor 
(Apr. 1, 1940), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-
articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/the-federal-prosecutor/. 
 93.  Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty:  Multijurisdictional Drug Law 
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1207 (1995) (“When two 
jurisdictions join forces in this way, the reasons for granting each sovereign the power to 
enforce its laws disappear. The two sovereignties in effect act as one sovereign; that they 
represent two governments becomes insignificant.”). 
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The concentration of such power and authority in a single actor renders 
federalism’s protective structure meaningless—a single government actor 
cannot serve as a check upon his or herself.   
The separation of powers principle is an ineffective check on 
prosecutors as well.
94
  As part of the executive branch of government, 
prosecutors have the power and the duty to enforce the laws.
95
  In theory, 
the judiciary and legislative branches are to serve as checks on 
prosecutorial power, however, in practice, prosecutors have essentially been 
left to regulate themselves.
96
  Depending solely on prosecutors to exercise 
self-restraint is problematic. Insulating a prosecutor’s actions from judicial 
review can lead to violations of citizens’ rights through the arbitrary, or 
worse, vindictive exercise of authority.
97
 Nevertheless, courts have 
consistently deferred to the expertise of prosecutors in declining to question 
their motives for charging and other important prosecutorial decisions.
98
 
Likewise, in an effort to give prosecutors the freedom and independence to 
enforce the law, the legislative branch has also been wary to hamper the 
prosecutorial process.
99
 In 1975, a proposal for federal legislation dealing 
with successive prosecutions in the federal system failed because it was 




The underlying dangers that arise out of the practice of cross-
designating prosecutors extend much further than the potential for dual or 
successive prosecutions. The sham exception to dual sovereignty was meant 
to address the breakdown of federalism that comes with the elimination of 
the “dual” aspect of dual sovereignty.
101
 In upholding the dual sovereignty 
doctrine the Supreme Court explained, “Bartkus and Abbate rest on the 
basic structure of our federal system, in which States and the National 
                                                                                                     
 94. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 14–15 (1st ed. 2009). 
 95. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).  
 96. See id. (noting that self-regulation is either nonexistent or inadequate). 
 97. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 
WASH. U.L.Q. 713, 732–33 (1999).    
 98. See id.  
 99. See id.   
 100. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARAH SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 772 (2d ed. 1993). 
 101. See United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 670 (W.D. Va. 1991) (noting the 
emphasis the Bartkus court placed on federalism).  
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Governments are separate political communities. State and Federal 
Governments [derive] power from different sources, each from the organic 
law that established it.”
102
 In discussing dual sovereignty the Supreme 
Court stated that each independent sovereign is “exercising its own 
sovereignty, not that of the other.”
103
 To fit within the exception, the 
defendant must show that one sovereign was so dominated or controlled by 
the actions of the other that officials had little or no independent volition in 
their proceedings.
104
 When a state prosecutor is cross-designated as a 
SAUSA and is involved in both federal and state prosecutions against a 
single defendant, it is difficult to conceive how that prosecutor, as a 
representative of both sovereigns, can act with independent volition. The 
cross-designated prosecutor is representative of both the state and federal 
governments. Thus, the interests of both sovereigns are unavoidably 
weighed when making decisions that can unjustly affect a criminal 
defendant. 
The centralization of power that occurs with the breakdown of 
federalism to which Bartkus alluded has arisen with cross-designated 
prosecutors.
105
 The dual sovereignty doctrine, which is nothing more than a 
legal fiction, cannot justify a cross-designated prosecutor instigating 
proceedings against the same defendant in separate sovereigns. When the 
two sovereigns are no longer acting as separate and distinct entities, the 
justifications for the dual sovereignty doctrine fall flat.
106
 Although the 
courts to consider challenges involving cross-designated prosecutors have 
failed to find sufficient collusion, the facts of these cases (discussed below) 
strongly suggest the existence of such collusion. When the power of two 
                                                                                                     
 102. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).   
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. 
Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994). However, federal courts have 
rejected applicability of the exception when prosecutions in which (1) state sovereigns 
requested federal prosecution, (2) the initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the 
second, and (3) cross designations of state officials as federal officials were made. See 
United States v. Angelton, 221 F. Supp.2d 696, 713–20 (S.D. Tex. 2002).   
 105. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1313 (“Concurrent jurisdiction due to the 
federalization of criminal law introduces a potential for prosecutorial abuse that was not an 
area of concern when crime was primarily a locally regulated phenomenon.”).  
 106. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155–56 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I 
have been shown nothing in the history of our Union, in the writings of its Founders, or 
elsewhere, to indicate that individual rights deemed essential by both State and Nation were 
to be lost through the combined operations of the two governments.”).   
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governments becomes centralized in one cross-designated prosecutor, it 
results in harms to the accused and to our criminal justice system. 
107
 
a. Harms to the Individual Defendant 
Not only does the model of centralized prosecution fail to provide 
“double security” for the individual rights of the accused—it fails to 
provide any security or protection whatsoever. From the perspective of the 
accused, facing federal and state charges concurrently or consecutively is 
an enormous burden.
108
 If those proceedings are strung out over a lengthy 
period of time the defendant is forced to live in a continuing state of 
uncertainty.
109
  The “inherent inequality” between prosecutors and 
defendants has intensified with the federalization of crime and the use of 
cross-designated prosecutors.
110
  The prosecutor’s investigating, charging, 
convicting, and sentencing powers have expanded, giving the prosecutor an 
unfair advantage over the individual defendant.
111
 This, along with the 
absence of any effective check on those powers lends itself to a strong 
potential for abuse during each phase of the criminal process.
112
  This 
pertains to prosecutorial power in general but applies with exponentially 
more force when a single prosecutor has the resources of both governments 
at his or her disposal along with the unchecked authority to make decisions 
on behalf of both sovereigns.  
                                                                                                     
 107. See Garry, supra note 71, at 874 (“The Constitution’s embodiment of the structural 
principles of federalism is designed not just to create a workable government but to create 
one that protects individual rights.”). 
 108. See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive 
and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 126 (1995) (observing that one of the risks 
of successive prosecutions is undue trauma and burdens from successive trials).  
 109. See id. (listing the risks of exposing a defendant to successive punishments and 
prosecutions). 
 110. See Gershman, supra note 67, at 395 (“More than thirty years later, as the 
prosecutor's investigating, charging, convicting, and sentencing powers have escalated, the 
‘inherent inequality’ between the prosecutor and the defendant has intensified, making the 
adversary system almost obsolete.”). 
 111. See id.   
 112. See id. at 408–09 (“Uncontrolled discretion in the hands of a powerful government 
official has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential is . . . a reality. 
Courts are unwilling to . . . rein in . . . prosecutors, resulting in a decline in the fairness of, 
and a loss of public confidence in, the system.”). 
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(1) Potential for Abuse In Making The Charging Decision 
The prosecutor holds the fate of the accused in his hands in making the 
charging decision.
113
 The potential for harassment is substantial as irrational 
and even unconstitutional motivations are distinct possibilities.
114
 Due to 
the federal-state concurrent jurisdiction, a cross-designated prosecutor can 
file charges in either federal or state court.
115
 A number of considerations 
inform this decision, many of which can give rise to selective and 
vindictive prosecution claims.
116
 For example, choosing what forum to 
prosecute particular offenders based on the availability of harsher 
penalties.
117
 Or where a prosecutor brings more serious charges in another 
sovereign after a defendant exercises his right to a jury trial and declines a 
plea deal.
118
 As one commentator explains, “[i]n theory, defendants can 
challenge dubious uses of prosecutorial discretion under the claims of 
selective prosecution as a violation of equal protection, or prosecutorial 
vindictiveness as a violation of due process.”
119
 However, such challenges 
succeed in only the most exceptional circumstances.
120
  
                                                                                                     
 113. See Clymer, supra note 3, at 647–48.   Clymer stated:  
Because of differences between federal and state criminal justice systems, an 
offender will often fare worse if prosecuted in federal court rather than state 
court. He may be detained pending trial when he would have been released if 
charged in state court, denied discovery allowable in state court, and confronted 
with evidence that would have been suppressed in state court. If convicted, a 
federally prosecuted defendant is likely to receive a longer sentence and to serve 
far more of that sentence than he would if sentenced in state court. 
Id.  
 114. See Heller supra note 49, at 1313 (explaining that prosecutorial abuse can occur 
when a federal prosecutor decides to prosecute a case in federal court based on such 
“constitutionally impermissible motives such as the defendant’s race, religion or 
ethnicity . . . . ”).  
 115. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Likewise 
under our federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions where 
similar or identical offenses under the two systems of law are committed as the result of 
particular conduct on the part of a defendant.”). 
 116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
 117. See infra notes 122–32 and accompanying text.   
 118. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution 
Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 247 
(2005) (explaining that local prosecutors have the ability to threaten to bring charges in 
federal court unless defendant pleads guilty).  
 119. Hollon, supra note 1, at 507.  
 120. See id. (citing United States v .Oakes, 11 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1993)).   
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(2) Selective Prosecution 
Serious concerns about a criminal defendant’s civil rights and liberties 
arise when a prosecutor chooses a certain forum based upon the likelihood 
of a conviction.
121
 A cross-designated prosecutor can engage in 
“prosecutorial forum shopping” to get the most favorable procedural and 
substantive rules.
122
 Federal laws provide defendants with fewer procedural 
rights than the law in many states.
123
 There is also a danger of manipulating 
the criminal process in order to bypass an unfavorable evidentiary ruling. 
For example, in United States v. Perchitti,
124
 the state of Florida originally 
indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. In 
the state proceeding, the judge granted the defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence. The state prosecutor, Darrell Dirks, then filed a nolle prosse on 
the state charges.
125
 Federal authorities subsequently indicted the defendant 
and appointed Dirks as a SAUSA to conduct the federal prosecution.
126
 
Unlike the state court, the District Court denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence.
127
 The defendant appealed the ruling but the Eleventh 
                                                                                                     
 121.  See Clymer, supra note 3, at 676–77.  Clymer stated:  
As a result of the disparity between state and federal procedural and sentencing 
regimes, much is at stake decisions are made more significant by the high 
conviction rate in federal court and the rigid determinative federal sentencing 
rules.  Because of the relative certainty of conviction and harsher sentencing, 
from an offender's perspective, the federal prosecutor's decision to bring federal 
charges may be the single most important decision that any actor in the criminal 
justice system makes. Defendants chosen for federal prosecution bear the brunt 
of federalization, losing procedural protections and receiving and serving longer 
sentences. 
Id.  
 122. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:  From Morals to 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (2005) (explaining that this 
gives prosecutors the ability to choose the forum where they are most likely to obtain a 
conviction, in part, because they are able to bypass state laws or policies favorable to the 
accused).  
 123. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law:  What the Feds Can Learn 
From the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 531 (2011) (“Fewer restrictions on the 
government’s use of informants, easier access to wiretaps and warrants, less generous 
discovery rights for defendants, and broader grand jury powers. Additionally, the federal 
jury pool may also differ from the state jury pool.”). 
 124. See generally United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 125. Id. at 675.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
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Circuit found no error in the District Court’s decision to deny the motion to 
suppress, reasoning that there was no privity between the federal and state 
government.
128
 Yet, to find that there was no privity when the same 
prosecutor represented both governments in the separate prosecutions 
seems to stretch the bounds of credulity.
129
 
A selective prosecution concern arises when similarly situated 
defendants who commit identical crimes face grossly disparate sentences 
depending on whether the state or the federal government handles the 
prosecution.
130
 Federal law generally provides for harsher punishments than 
its state law counterparts.
 131
 For example, when a prosecutor foregoes state 
prosecution in favor of federal prosecution of a drug offender charged with 
possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine, the applicable federal guidelines 
subject the defendant to a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment.
132
 
The same defendant is only subject to a three-year minimum sentence if 
prosecuted in the state courts of California or Pennsylvania.
133
  
Courts have rejected equal protection and due process challenges to 
disparate sentencing on the ground that a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute 
a defendant federally is generally insulated from review.
134
 This is true even 
                                                                                                     
 128. Id.   
 129. The same set of facts were present in United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 893 
(4th Cir. 1988) where the Fourth Circuit again found that there was no privity between the 
two governmental parties even though the same prosecutor conducted each prosecution.   
 130. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 503 (“Broad grants of federal criminal jurisdiction 
have created a situation in which defendants who commit identical crimes face grossly 
disparate sentences depending on whether they are prosecuted by the state or by the federal 
government.”). 
 131. See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:  
Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1024 (2001) (explaining that local 
prosecutors can use threat of federal prosecution, with its likely harsher punishments, as a 
threat in plea negotiations).   
 132. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2014). The sentencing guidelines are no longer 
mandatory but many federal courts do not allow a downward departure from the sentencing 
guidelines simply because a state statute proscribes a lower sentence for the same conduct.  
Heller, supra note 49 at 1358. 
 133. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 113.51.5 (West 1991); see also 18 PA. CONST. 
STAT. ANN. § 7508(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).  
 134.  See, e.g., United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 873 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that 
the decision to prosecute drug-related charges in federal court while leaving arrest-related 
charges in state court pursuant to explicit referral policy and agreement between federal and 
state prosecutors is proper); see also United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 
2001) (stating that the decision to bring federal charges to maximize punishment for a crime 
that had historically been prosecuted under state system is proper); see also United States. v. 
Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to prosecute in federal 
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where the prosecutor’s decision to file in federal court “was not made 
pursuant to written policy, was motivated by a desire to impose a harsher 
sentence, and was inconsistent with the treatment given other 
defendants.”
135
 Thus, defendants are precluded from obtaining relief even 
where the cross-designated prosecutor was motivated solely by a desire to 
impose more stringent sentences.
136
 Another example of the extreme 
sentencing disparities that can result based upon which sovereign 
prosecutes a defendant can be seen in United States v. Willis.
137
 This case 
involved two brothers involved in the same cocaine transaction.
138
 Federal 
prosecutors dismissed the charges against one brother, who was prosecuted 
in state court and sentenced only to probation plus time served while 
awaiting trial.
139
  The other brother was tried in federal court and was 




                                                                                                     
rather than state court is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation though federal 
conviction yields a greater sentence); see also Reed v. United States, 985 F.2d 880, 882–83 
(7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the decision to prosecute in federal rather than state court did not 
evidence an abuse of prosecutorial discretion though state law was more lenient); see also 
Bell v. United States, 48 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the decision to 
prosecute in federal rather than state court was insufficient to prove a constitutional 
violation, though federal conviction yields a greater sentence, because there was no proof 
decision based on impermissible factors); see also United States v. Williams, 282 F.3d 679, 
682 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that sentencing guidelines do not allow court to interfere with 
prosecutor's discretion to charge defendant in federal rather than state court absent evidence 
that prosecutor abused power); see also United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (stating that the decision to prosecute a robbery case in federal court may properly 
be based on whether harsher penalties are available in federal or state court); see also United 
States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 599 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to prosecute in 
federal rather than state court does not constitute a due process violation, though defendant 
was subjected to harsher sentence because prosecutor can properly be influenced by 
available penalties); see also United States v. Clark, 8 F.3d 839, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(stating that the decision to prosecute in federal rather than state court was insufficient to 
prove a constitutional violation though federal conviction would yield a greater sentence). 
 135. United States v. Oakes, 11 F. 3d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 136. See Oakes, 11 F.3d at 899 (noting that charging decisions not based on suspect 
characteristics are insulated from review “even where the prosecutor’s decision to file in 
federal court was not made pursuant to written policy, was motivated by a desire to impose a 
harsher sentence, and was inconsistent with the treatment given other defendants”).  
 137. United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 811 (11th Cir. 1998).  
 138. See id.   
 139. See id.   
 140. See Sun Beale, supra note 122, at 782 (outlining a situation where the sentencing 
judge reduced the sentence to thirteen months but the appeals court vacated the judgment 
and remanded for resentencing).  However, this was before the Supreme Court mandated 
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Another example of circumstances giving rise to a selective 
prosecution claim can be seen in United States v. Jones.
141
 In Jones, the 
defendant brought a selective prosecution claim based upon practices of the 
federal-state joint task force program Project Exile.
142
 Project Exile was a 
joint undertaking of the cities of Richmond and Norfolk, Virginia and the 
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District to address criminal narcotics and 
firearms offenses.
143
 One Commonwealth attorney and one attorney from 
the state attorney general’s office were cross-designated as SAUSAs to 
federally prosecute local offenders who committed firearm-related 
offenses.
144
 The objective of Project Exile was to transfer offenders out of 
the state system and into the federal system because state court judges were 
perceived less likely to impose sentences “severe enough to serve as 
sufficient punishment for, or adequate deterrence of, narcotics related 
firearm offenses.”
145
 Not only were the sentencing structures in the federal 
and state systems different, but pre-trial release from custody was routine 
during state prosecutions and rare during federal prosecutions. Additionally, 
there were racial differences between the state and federal jury pools.
146
 
One of the stated goals of Project Exile was to avoid “Richmond juries.”
147
 
The jury pool for the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond was 
approximately seventy-five percent African-American.
148
 In contrast, the 
jury pool for the Richmond Division of the Eastern District of Virginia is 
                                                                                                     
that the sentencing guidelines are advisory only.  Now, presumably a judge may depart 
downward in light of the existence of a lenient state sentence.  Courts have taken various 
approaches on this matter.  Compare United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 
2005) (finding that an out-of-guidelines adjustment was justified in order to bring defendant 
Jaber’s sentence into line with the sentences imposed on other more culpable participants in 
scheme), with United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding that 
except in most exceptional cases district courts should sentence within the guidelines in 
order to prevent disparity). 
 141. United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999).  
 142. Id. at 311.   
 143. Id. at 307.   
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 309 (citing  United States v. Nathan, No. 3:98cr116, Mem. Op. at 23–25 
(E.D. Va., July 23, 1998)).  
 146. Id. at 313 (noting that seventy-five percent of Richmond juries are African-
American while only ten percent of federal juries are African-American).   
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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drawn from a broader area and was only about ten percent African 
American at that time.
149
 
Project Exile had a disparate effect on Virginia’s African-American 
population.
150
 The court in Jones noted that Project Exile “would be 
vulnerable on selective prosecution grounds if African-Americans were 
routinely diverted from state to federal prosecution while prosecutors 
allowed similarly situated Caucasian defendants to remain in state court.”
151
 
However, the claim was dismissed because the defendant produced no 
evidence to that effect.
152
 
The judge in Jones also noted the substantial latitude afforded to 
prosecuting attorneys is undoubtedly accompanied by the potential for 
abuse. He stated that Project Exile “raises serious questions respecting basic 
principles of federalism.”
153
 And that where “the local authorities claim to 
have the capacity to address the problem, the invited federal incursion 
raises serious motivational concerns.”
154
 These examples are illustrative of 
the abuses of discretion that can occur when a single prosecutor possesses 
the ability to manipulate the investigative and prosecutorial resources of 
either sovereign to secure a conviction.  
(3) Vindictive Prosecution 
A vindictive prosecution concern arises when a cross-designated 
prosecutor uses his or her authority to increase charges or to retry a 
defendant in another jurisdiction to obtain what he or she believes is a more 
just result.
155
 Courts have consistently declined to find vindictive 
prosecution where the prosecutor increased charges before trial, reasoning 
                                                                                                     
 149. As troubling as this may seem, the court nevertheless held that the defendant 
showed no evidence to suggest that the selection of federal juries was constitutionally infirm. 
It went on to explain that a defendant has no right to a jury of any particular racial 
composition so long as that jury is fairly selected from the jurisdiction it serves.  See Jones, 
36 F. Supp. 2d at 304.   
 150. See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (noting that approximately ninety percent of the 
Project Exile defendants are African-American). 
 151. Id. at 311.  
 152. Id.   
 153. Id. at 313.  
 154. Id. at 316.  
 155. See Killion, supra note 11, at 800 (explaining that “allegiances can cause a 
SAUSA to skirt the line between zealous advocacy and vindictive prosecution.”).   
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that a prosecutor has broad discretion to add charges in the pre-trial 
period.
156
 The burden to establish vindictive prosecution is so high that even 
when the facts of the case strongly suggest vindictiveness on the part of the 
prosecutor, the courts decline to find such.
157
 Allowing prosecutors this 
level of discretion effectively allows the prosecutor to impermissibly 
substitute his or her judgment for that of the judge or jury.  
There is a substantial vindictive prosecution concern present when a 
prosecutor uses his or her ability to bring charges in another jurisdiction as 
leverage over the defendant to obtain a desired outcome. In the plea 
bargaining context, there is a significant risk of coercion, duress, and 
manipulation that forces individual defendants to accept an unfavorable 
plea deal in one jurisdiction to avoid facing prosecution in a less favorable 
forum.
158
 As one defense attorney stated, “[c]riminal defendants and their 
lawyers often are faced with the potential for dual prosecutions . . . . They 
must always ‘bargain in the shadow of the law.’”
159
 An example of this can 
be seen in United States v. Raymer.
160
 In Raymer, the defendant claimed 
that the following factors established a realistic likelihood of 
vindictiveness:  
(1) the federal prosecution was undertaken after defendant asserted 
rights incident to extradition, (2) a superseding indictment adding 
substantive counts was returned after the defendant obtained pretrial 
release, contrary to the government’s wishes, (3) the federal government 
lacked substantial involvement in the investigation and prosecution of 
this case, and (4) the state and federal investigations and prosecutions 
were influenced by the discretion of a single state prosecutor.
161
 
                                                                                                     
 156. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit a prosecutor from carrying 
out a threat made during plea negotiations, to bring additional charges against an accused 
who refused to plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged). 
 157. See Killion, supra note 11, at 800 (“[T]he courts have required defendants to meet 
the difficult burden of proving the elements of selective and vindictive prosecution, even 
though evidence supporting these claims is unlikely to appear on the record.”). 
 158. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution 
Nexus:  A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 243 
(2005) (“They can also use the threat of federal prosecution to leverage longer sentences in 
the plea-bargaining process . . . .”). 
 159. See id. at 265.  
 160. See United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1991).   
 161. Id. at 1039. 
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The Tenth Circuit observed that it would be “naïve to think that the 
federal prosecution was not motivated in some part by the extradition 
difficulties.” The court further noted “the prosecutor’s obtaining a more 
serious federal indictment when the defendant asserted a right concerning 
extradition may appear to warrant an inference of vindictiveness.”
162
 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that this did not warrant a 
presumption of vindictiveness because the prosecutor’s strategy was a 
product of failed plea negotiations which culminated in the defendant’s 
insistence on formal extradition.
163
 This is illustrative of the difficulty in 
trying to assert a vindictive prosecution claim based on pretrial events.
164
  
A vindictive prosecution concern also arises when a defendant 
successfully obtains dismissal of state charges only to have the same 
prosecutor, in his capacity as a cross-designated SAUSA, indict the 
defendant federally for the same conduct.  This troubling sequence of 
events is exactly what happened in United States v. Bernhardt.
165
 In 1984, 
the state of Hawaii charged the Bernhardts with conspiracy and 
misapplication of bank funds.
166
 The Bernhardts obtained a dismissal on 
statute of limitation grounds.
167
 However, shortly before the state court 
dismissed the case, Stephen Mayo, the prosecutor in charge of the state 
case, contacted the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii to 
express his concern over the pending dismissal.
168
 Up until that point, there 
had been no federal involvement in the matter, nor had the federal 
government even considered the matter “one that justified exercise of 
federal sovereignty”.
169
 The U.S. Attorney agreed to undertake a federal 
prosecution under the condition that Mayo would become the lead attorney 
for the federal case and that the state would pay Mayo’s salary.
170
 The 
Bernhardts moved to dismiss the federal indictment on double jeopardy 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 1042.   
 163. Id.   
 164. While this abuse of power to gain leverage over a defendant most often occurs in 
the plea-bargaining context, it can also occur when the prosecutor needs the defendant to 
testify against a co-defendant.  See Hollon, supra note 1, at 504. 
 165. United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 166. Id. at 181.  
 167. Id.   
 168. Id.   
 169. Id.   
 170. Id. at 181–82.   
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grounds, as well as vindictive prosecution and collateral estoppel.
171
 The 
Ninth Circuit found that this was more than “mere cooperation,” and 
described the circumstances as “troubling”.
172
 Nevertheless, the court 
rejected the Bernhardts claims, relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine and 
reasoning that the federal and state prosecutions, although for the same 
conduct, were prosecuting separate offenses.
173
 This is illustrative of the 
enormous burden criminal defendants have in challenging the practice of 
cross-designated prosecutors. Because of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the 
designation of a SAUSA permits an attorney to proceed with what the 
courts would otherwise presume to be a vindictive prosecution. 
A similar situation occurred in United States v. Belcher.
174
 In Belcher, 
Commonwealth’s Attorney McAfee indicted defendants on drug offenses in 
state circuit court.
175
 The indictments were dismissed and McAfee secured 
another indictment.
176
 The defendant then sought dismissal of that 
indictment.
177
 While this motion was pending, McAfee, in his federal guise, 
drafted a three-count indictment against Belcher.
178
 He then proceeded to 
write letters to an Assistant United States Attorney and a United States 
Attorney expressing his concern that the State court would dismiss the 
indictment.
179
 In the letters he also indicated his willingness to handle the 
Belcher’s federal prosecution.
180
 After learning that the U.S. Attorney’s 
office would submit his indictment to the federal grand jury, McAfee 
moved to nolle prosse the pending state indictment.
181
 The defendants 
moved to dismiss the federal indictment based, in part, on theories of 
selective and vindictive prosecution.
182
 The court found that there was a 
valid vindictive prosecution claim because the prosecutor filed new, and 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 182–83.   
 173. Id. at 183.   
 174. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991).  
 175. Id. at 668. 
 176. Id.   
 177. Id.   
 178. Id.   
 179. Id.  
 180. Id.   
 181. Id.   
 182. Id. at 669.   
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more severe, federal charges based on the same transaction after the 
defendant successfully appealed his state conviction.
183
  
That case was not the first where McAfee secured an indictment in a 
different sovereign after an unsuccessful prosecution.
184
 The court noted 
that he appeared recently as a SAUSA to prosecute two defendants on drug 
charges.
185
 The jury acquitted both defendants and McAfee proceeded to 
secure a state indictment on the same charges.
186
 He gained a conviction of 
the defendant in State court even though she had been acquitted in federal 
court.
187
 The court observed, “It is likely that somewhere in such a chain of 
events prosecution ends and persecution begins, that government power 
becomes so oppressive to the citizen that she no longer has the power or 
will to defend herself.”
188
 Unfortunately, the opinion in that case is an 
anomaly among the cases involving challenges to cross-designated 
prosecutors.
189
 If defendants are to have any protection from abuses of 
power similar to those illustrated above, other courts must take note of the 
reasoning behind the decision and follow suit.  
(4) Disproportionate Punishment 
A defendant’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment is also implicated when a prosecutor uses his or her power to 
harass or punish the defendant by overcharging and thus, exposing the 
defendant to excessive or disproportionate punishment relative to the 
defendant’s culpability.
190
 Because of the overlap in offenses and penalties 
for the same conduct in state and federal criminal laws, a cross-designated 
prosecutor has the power to bring charges in both jurisdictions for the same 
act, and thus, punish a defendant more than once for that act.
191
 The Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment should serve as 
                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 669–70.   
 184. Id. at 673.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.   
 189. Although many courts have considered cases containing similar facts, those courts 
have declined to find any violation.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text.   
 190. King, supra note 108, at 126.  
 191. Id.  
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a check on this type of disproportionate punishment. As one scholar noted, 
“[i]f double jeopardy permits legislatures to authorize successive penalties 
for the same conduct, then the more flexible commands of the Eighth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses must pick up the slack.”
192
 
Likewise, Justice Frankfurter suggested in United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess,
193
 that the appropriate source of constraint on the ability to cumulate 
punishment is the limit on proportionality in the Eighth Amendment. He 
wrote:  
If it be suggested that a succession of separate trials for the enforcement 
of a great number of criminal sanctions, even though set forth in 
advance in a single statute, might be a form of cruelty or oppression, the 
answer is that the Constitution itself has guarded against such an attempt 
“to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated 
trials . . . by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments.
194
  
An example of disproportionate punishment can be seen in United 
States v. Grimes.
195
 Grimes was charged and convicted in state and federal 
court for the same bank robbery.
196
 He made persistent attempts to have his 
state and federal sentences served concurrently or credited against each 
other.
197
 However, his attempts were unsuccessful because “[t]he rule of 
presumptive concurrency of sentences . . . does not apply where one 
sentence is imposed by a federal court and the other by a state court.”
198
  
The defendant’s sentencing challenge was premised in a double jeopardy 
claim because the duplicative punishment was allowed pursuant to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine.
199
 The court in Grimes urged a reexamination of 
Bartkus to determine whether the justifications of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine are still viable with the expansion of federal criminal law.
200
 
However, the court acknowledged that it was not the proper forum to 
overturn “a legal directive from the Supreme Court” and thus rejected the 
                                                                                                     
 192. Id. at 125.  
 193. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 556 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).   
 194. Id.  
 195. United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981).  
 196. Id. at 97. 
 197. See id. at 98 (“Persistent attempts have been made by Ali to have his state and 
federal sentences served concurrently or credited against each other.”). 
 198. Id. at 100.  
 199. Id. at 97.   
 200. Id. at 101.   
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defendant’s double jeopardy claim.
201
 Although this case did not involve a 
cross-designated prosecutor, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a 
cross-designated prosecutor uses his or her power to overcharge in order to 
disproportionately punish the defendant.  
(5) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
This model of centralized prosecution also has a detrimental impact on 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.
202
  Having to “fight in two arenas at 
once” invariably creates disadvantages for the defense counsel, and thus for 
the defendant.
203
  The government is able to potentially exhaust the 
defendant’s financial ability to adequately defend himself by “whipsawing 
him from one jurisdiction to another.”
204
  Additionally, many defense 
attorneys may be familiar with the laws, rules, and procedures in only one 
of the jurisdictions. This may necessitate hiring a second attorney. 
Unfortunately, as many criminal defendants are unable to afford their own 
attorney and must use an overworked and underpaid public defender. This 
presents another problem: the potential inability of an overburdened public 
defender to recognize and address the problems a defendant will face when 
subjected to concurrent prosecutions. The expansion of federal criminal 
jurisdiction over the years has resulted in increasing resources being 
devoted to enforcing federal criminal law.
205
  In contrast, public defense 
services remain devastatingly underfunded.
206
 There is a real danger of 
deficient performance on the part of the defense counsel when the public 
defense system is overburdened and underfunded.
207
 A cross-designated 
prosecutor has the ability to take advantage of a defendant by 
overburdening his defense counsel to the point where any assistance 
received is virtually ineffective.  
                                                                                                     
 201. Id. at 104.   
 202. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 501–02 (explaining that the resource disparity caused 
by Congress’ systematic underfunding of defense services violates the defendant’s right to 
counsel).  
 203. See David L. Lane, Twice Bitten: Denial of the Right to Counsel in Successive 
Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1869, 1900 (2009).  
 204. See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 171.   
 205. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 501–02. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. (explaining that in the overburdened public defender services, ineffective 
assistance more often results from an attorney’s errors of omission). 
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(6) Defendant’s Interest in Finality and Accuracy of the Verdict 
Beyond equal protection, due process, effective assistance, and 
proportionate punishment violations, centralized prosecutions also affect a 
defendant’s interest in finality and accuracy of the verdict. As one 
commentator observes, “When the federal government seeks to prosecute a 
defendant following an acquittal in a state prosecution, the interests and 
rights of the defendant are often compromised . . . . ”
208
 Multiple 
prosecutions allow the government to hone its trial strategies through 
successive attempts at conviction. This is especially true when the same 
prosecutor conducts each proceeding.  As Justice Souter explained in his 
dissent in United States v. Dixon, the government could “. . . bring a person 
to trial again and again for that same conduct, violating the principle of 
finality, subjecting him repeatedly to all the burdens of trial, rehearsing its 
prosecution, and increasing the risk of erroneous conviction . . . .”
209
  
Although Dixon concerned successive prosecutions as a double jeopardy 
violation, the dangers presented in Justice Souter’s dissent apply with 
considerably more force when a single prosecutor is able to prosecute a 
defendant in separate sovereigns for the same conduct using the same 
evidence.
210
  Both practices conflict with the prosecutor’s well-known duty, 
not simply to convict but to seek justice.
211
  In discussing the prosecutor’s 
responsibilities, the Supreme Court stated:  
[I]s not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, 
he is in a particular and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.  




                                                                                                     
 208. Robert Matz, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If At First You 
Don’t Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 375 (1997).  
 209. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 761 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 210. See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 171 (“The Cross Designated-Prosecutor 
could utilize his position to refile in the second forum by his ability to use certain evidence 
barred in the first. New evidence could come to light which might increase the potential for a 
second, and perhaps successful prosecution. . . . A premature prosecution which was not 
successful could be re-filed in the second forum upon further development of the case.”). 
 211.  Alafair S. Bourke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 83 
(2010).   
 212. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S 78, 88 (1935); see also Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The function of the 
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A prosecutor retrying a defendant after an unsuccessful prosecution—
taking a second bite of the apple—is undoubtedly an impermissible 
prosecutorial practice. Yet, courts have allowed exactly that. There have 
been many cases involving subsequent indictments based on a prosecutorial 
sense that justice has not been served.
213
 When this occurs, the prosecutor is 
improperly substituting his or her own judgment for that of the judge or 
jury.
214
 An example of this can be seen in United States v. Padilla where the 
defendant pled guilty to state criminal charges only to be federally indicted 
by the same prosecutor utilizing the same evidence. In his concurrence, 
Judge Logan observed, “It appears to be the state prosecutor’s frustration 
with the sentence given defendant by the state court which led him, in his 
new capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney, to seek the federal 
indictment.
215
 In the previously discussed case of United States v. Figueroa-
Soto,
216
 the court failed to find sufficient collusion where the federal 
authorities: (1) requested state prosecution, (2) sat at the prosecutor’s table, 
(3) testified as witnesses, (4) collected evidence for use by the state in the 
state prosecution, (5) postponed sentencing a prosecution witness until after 
he testified for the state, (6) delayed a forfeiture proceeding to avoid 
prejudicing the state prosecution, and lastly (7) cross-designated the state 
prosecutor as a SAUSA to conduct the federal prosecution while still on the 
                                                                                                     
prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to take as many skins of victims as possible 
to the wall.  His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give 
those accused of crime a fair trial.”).  
 213. See Lane, supra note 203, at n. 234; see, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84–
86 (1985) (defendant confessed to crime in one jurisdiction and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, refused to testify to grand jury in separate jurisdiction, and was subsequently 
charged with and tried for capital murder in that jurisdiction despite widespread 
publicity); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 121–22 (1959) (defendant acquitted of 
bank robbery in federal district court, then investigated and charged in state court using same 
evidence supplied by FBI agent who investigated federal case); see also United States v. 
Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendant granted probation on state charges and 
state then asked U.S Attorney to prosecute without success; only after defendant violated 
probation on the state charges and state renewed request for federal prosecution were federal 
charges brought); or perhaps the most famous of all, the “Rodney King Case,” United States 
v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994) (four Los Angeles police officers acquitted in 
state court on charges of assault with a deadly weapon and excessive use of force by a police 
officer were later charged with multiple federal crimes, including violation of King's 
constitutional rights). 
 214. Lane, supra note 203, at 1908.  
 215. United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 485–86 (10th Cir. 1978) (Logan, J., 
concurring).   
 216. United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1991).   




 Accepting that this level of collusion is permissible 
simply because the prosecutions were conducted in separate sovereigns 
stretches the bounds of belief. Criminal defendants are already in an 
inherently unequal position in comparison to prosecutors without the added 
burden of a prosecutor having the ability to manipulate the resources of two 
sovereigns.  
The danger of convicting innocent defendants also occurs in the plea 
bargaining context. Prosecutors possess unchecked power to overcharge 
and generate easy pleas.
218
 As one scholar noted, “[t]his excessive plea 
leverage reduces the prosecutors’ incentive to separate innocent from guilty 
defendants at the charging stage, increasing the chance that innocent 
defendants will be convicted.”
219
 In this context, prosecutors become the 
sole judges of crime and punishment.
220
 This potential for abuse of power is 
increased when a single prosecutor has the unrestrained ability to charge a 
defendant under both state and federal criminal statutes.  
b. Harms to the Criminal Justice System 
In addition to the numerous risks and abuses defendants face with 
centralized prosecutions, when multiple sovereigns are “investigating the 
same crime and pursuing punishment of the same defendant . . . it is 
wasteful of police, prosecutorial and judicial resources.”
221
 In discussing the 
increased federalization of crime and its effect on federal courts, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stated: 
The trend to federalize crimes that traditionally been handled in state 
courts not only is taxing the Judiciary’s resources and affecting its 
budget needs, but it also threatens to change entirely the nature of our 
federal system . . . . Federal courts were not created to adjudicate local 
crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the crimes may be. State 
courts do, can, and should handle such problems.
222
 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. at 1018–19.   
 218. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: 
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 
1679–80 (2002).   
 219. Id.    
 220. See Luna & Wade, supra note 90, at 1423. 
 221. Lane, supra note 203, at 1900.  
 222. William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD 
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These concerns apply with full force when a cross-designated prosecutor is 
able to bypass state courts and circumvent a variety of protective state laws 
and thus, use federal prosecution as a tool to secure a more favorable 
outcome.
223
 When cases that have been traditionally tried by state courts are 
pulled into the federal court system, the capacity of the relatively small 
federal court system is overwhelmed.
 224
 This hinders the ability of the 
federal judiciary to fulfill its other functions, such as the enforcement of 
federal constitutional and statutory rights.
225
  
In addition to the increasing number of cases competing for the scarce 
attention of federal courts, the federal prison system is also affected by the 
higher rate of federal prosecutions that have followed the federalization of 
crime.
226
 Following the implementation of joint task forces like Project 
Exile, the federal prison system has experienced a higher rate of inmate 
increase than state systems.
227
   
Federal Courts are not meant to be courts of general jurisdiction; they 
are to resolve the defined set of matters that the Constitution envisions for 
them.
228
 Extensive prosecutions of the overlapping federal and state 
offenses blur this unique role. The federal expansion of criminal laws and 
the increasing overlap and entanglement of state and federal laws and 
enforcement of those laws has transformed the historic state-federal judicial 
relationship into an increasingly dysfunctional judicial system.
229
  
                                                                                                     
BRANCH (1999).   
 223. See Beale, supra note 122, at 768–69 (“These include a more powerful federal 
grand jury system in which witnesses and potential defendants have fewer procedural rights, 
lower standards for the approval of search warrants, a lower burden of proof to justify a wire 
tap, and more restricted discovery of the government's case. Unlike state law, federal law 
also permits a conviction on the basis of an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony.”). 
 224. See Brown, supra note 131, at 997 (“A large volume of prosecutions under the 
overlapping statutes may crowd out ‘traditional federal criminal law prosecutions and 
many . . . increasingly complicated federal civil suits . . . .’”). 
 225. See Beale, supra note 122, at 772–73.   
 226. See JAMES STRAZELLA ET AL., TASK FORCE ON THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. SEC., THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 51 (1998) (including the higher rate of inmate 
increase in federal prisons as one of the drains on federal resources). 
 227. See Brown, supra note 131, at 997. 
 228. Id. at 998. 
 229.  See Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for 
Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 72, 72 (1996).  
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Various scholars assert that a “vigorous federalism in the criminal law 
area operates to protect both state and national institutions.”
230
 However, 
the federalization of criminal law and the use of cross-designated 
prosecutors has resulted in a breakdown of the “vigorous federalism” 
necessary to protect the separate functions of these institutions.
231
  
IV.  Ineffective Protections  
There are several commonly proposed protections that ostensibly 
protect a criminal defendant from the various abuses and injustices inherent 
in a model of centralized prosecution.  However, as will be explained, these 
protections are ineffective and do not provide defendants with any real 
redress.  
A. The Bartkus Exception 
Defendants have futilely tried to find recourse via judicial remedy, 
asserting the Bartkus exception as a defense to successive prosecutions.
232
 
                                                                                                     
 230. See Brown, supra note 131, at 998.  
 231. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 229, at 72–74. They explained:  
Critics of federalization foresee in the expansion of federal criminal legislation 
the potential for dire consequences for federalism and for the federal criminal 
justice system: a flood of local cases overwhelming the federal courts and 
impairing their ability to carry out their traditional functions; interference with 
state control over domains traditionally regulated by the states; harm to 
democracy as decision making is shifted away from the most directly 
accountable levels of government; preemption of valuable experimentation with 
local solutions to crime problems; inefficient duplication of resources; 
ineffective legislation enacted for short-term political benefits; and unfairly 
disparate treatment of defendants selected for federal prosecution. 
Id.  
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 88 F. App’x 96, 98 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have 
never formally recognized or applied such an exception . . . .”); United States v. Tirrell, 120 
F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 2004) (“At any rate, the exception, if it exists at all, is a very narrow 
one.  Even significant cooperation between federal and state agencies is not enough to make 
the second prosecution a ‘sham.’” (citations omitted)); United States v. McCloud, No. 
CR406-247, 2007 WL 1706353, at *8 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (“The Eleventh Circuit has 
‘repeatedly refused to decide whether such an exception actually exists.’" (quoting United 
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999))).  But see United 
States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996) (“We emphasize that the Bartkus 
exception is narrow.  It is limited to situations in which one sovereign so thoroughly 
dominates or manipulates the prosecutorial machinery of another that the latter retains little 
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Courts continuously resist attempts to reverse convictions of those 
defendants claiming the exception, even in cases presenting the strongest 
evidence of intergovernmental collusion—dual prosecutions led by cross-
designated prosecutors. The context of the Bartkus opinion suggesting 
judicial recourse is inherently narrow and fails to serve as a reliable claim 
for threatened defendants.   
The “sham prosecution” exception arising in the Supreme Court’s 
dicta fails to offer defendants any real protection when facing simultaneous 
or successive prosecutions by a single cross-designated prosecutor. The 
courts have set the bar so high for the “sham prosecution” exception that 
sufficiently collusive conduct between state and federal officials is very 
seldom found, even when the same cross-designated prosecutor handles 
both prosecutions.
233
 In United States v. Angleton,
234
 the trial court 
responded that the facts of Bartkus and many other subsequent prosecution 
cases considered by the federal courts indicated there could be extensive 
involvement between governments without such cooperation rising to the 
level of a collusive prosecution.
235
  “Among the examples cited by the trial 
court were prosecutions in which (1) state sovereigns requested federal 
prosecution, (2) the initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the 
                                                                                                     
or no volition in its own proceedings.”); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1994) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has recognized a “narrow exception” to the doctrine of 
dual sovereignty); United States v. Knight, No. 05-81155, 2006 WL 1722199, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. June 22, 2006) (finding that dual involvement of an officer in both federal and state 
prosecutions of the defendant invited abuse and constituted a “sham prosecution”).  For a 
summary of case law concerning the Bartkus Exception, see Guzman, 85 F.3d at 826–27. 
 233. Courts have set the bar so high that the “exception” is effectively meaningless, 
thus encouraging further such collusion.  See, e.g., Baker, 88 F.App'x at 98 (“[W]e have 
never formally recognized or applied such an exception. . . .”); Tirrell, 120 F.3d at 677 (“At 
any rate, the exception, if it exists at all, is a very narrow one.  Even significant cooperation 
between federal and state agencies is not enough to make the second prosecution a ‘sham.’” 
(citations omitted)); McCloud, 2007 WL 1706353, at *8 (“The Eleventh Circuit has 
‘repeatedly refused to decide whether such an exception actually exists.’” (quoting United 
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999))). But see Guzman, 
85 F.3d at 827 (“We emphasize that the Bartkus exception is narrow. It is limited to 
situations in which one sovereign so thoroughly dominates or manipulates the prosecutorial 
machinery of another that the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings.”); 
Koon, 34 F.3d at 1438 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has recognized a “narrow exception” to 
the doctrine of dual sovereignty); Knight, 2006 WL 1722199, at *3 (finding that dual 
involvement of an officer in both federal and state prosecutions of the defendant invited 
abuse and constituted a “sham prosecution”).  
 234. 221 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  
 235. See id. at 714–15. 
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The failure of courts to find sufficient collusion to invoke the 
exception does not mean that collusive conduct does not occur or that it is 
not harmful when it does occur.
237
  Because of the narrowness of the 
Bartkus exception (coupled with judicial deference to prosecutorial 
decision-making), many improper practices escape scrutiny. Some of these 
practices include “enticing guilty pleas that are later used in another 
jurisdiction, rejuvenation or sharing of tainted evidence, or any other 
obvious attempt to strengthen charges against an individual beyond normal 
investigatory techniques.”
238
 The opportunity for the use of these improper 
tactics is increased greatly when a single prosecutor conducts both 
prosecutions. 
Only one court has applied the principles of the Bartkus exception as a 
justification for denying a successive prosecution by a cross-designated 
prosecutor. In United States v. Belcher,
239
 the judge observed that the 
prosecutor, by virtue of his cross-designation as a SAUSA, had the ability 
to function as a prosecutor at both the State and federal levels.
240
 The judge 
reasoned that the kind of power possessed by the prosecutor in that case 
was inconsistent with the concepts of federalism implicit in the 
Constitution.
241
 He explained that the fact that the “two sovereigns have 
essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor strongly suggests to the 
court that in reality there are no longer two sovereigns at work . . . . the 
pooling of prosecutorial power effectively creates one ‘super sovereign,’ 
i.e., a unitary government.”
242
  
If the issues motivating the Bartkus Court’s concern are to have 
meaningful redress, courts must explicitly define the scope of the “sham 
prosecution” to include instances of cross-designated prosecutors 
prosecuting defendants in different sovereigns. Whether the prosecutor is 
actually harassing the defendant or manipulating his role on behalf of either 
                                                                                                     
 236. See White, supra note 44, at 186.  
 237. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1899. 
 238. See id. at 1907.  
 239. 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va.1991). 
 240. See id. at 673. 
 241. See id. at 671 (“[I]t seems to the court that if the same prosecutor simultaneously 
derives power from both a State and the federal government, then the whole underpinning of 
federalism is destroyed.”).  
 242. See id. at 671. 
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sovereign is immaterial, as representation of dual sovereigns constructively 
serves as undue influence on both, constructively resulting in a “sham.” 
B. Petite Policy and State Legislation  
To ameliorate some of the unfairness inherent in multiple prosecutions 
by different sovereigns, the federal government and many states have 
established limitations, or even prohibitions, on subsequent prosecutions 
after an initial prosecution in which double jeopardy has attached.
243
   
1. Petite Policy 
Only one branch of the Federal government, the Executive, has 
presented an available protection for harms occurring in the cross-
designation system. As a response to the concerns over the dual-sovereignty 
issues in Bartkus and Abbate, the Department of Justice instituted the Petite 
Policy,
244
 which establishes a strong presumption against federal 




The Petite Policy has been formalized as Section 9-2.031 of the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual, a publication of departmental policy 
statements.
246
 The Petite Policy “precludes the initiation or continuation of 
a federal prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based 
on substantially the same act(s) or transactions(s).”
247
 These guidelines are 
to direct the Department of Justice in deciding whether the Government 
should prosecute a defendant following a state prosecution.
248
 Under the 
Policy, prosecutors are to presume that any prior trial vindicated federal 
                                                                                                     
 243. See White, supra note 44, at 174. 
 244. Named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (vacating a judgment at 
the request of the Justice Department made in accordance with its new policy).   
 245. White, supra note 44, at 199. 
 246. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 229, at 73. 
 247. See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary 
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 177–178 (2004). 
 248. See id.  




 However, the presumption can be overcome if there are factors 
suggesting an “un-vindicated federal interest.”
250
  
Even when the policy is followed to its full effect, it fails to address 
concerns raised by centralized prosecutions. Because the adhering to the 
Policy is not mandatory, various forms of coercive harassment in 
simultaneous prosecutions are not deterred, thus, it only dilutes those 
threats of subsequent federal proceedings without providing protections 
from or redress for any injustices faced.
251
 Additionally, the Petite policy is 
susceptible to manipulation and political pressure.
252
 Criminal defendants 
facing simultaneous or successive prosecutions should find no comfort in 
the existence of the Petite Policy, as it vests no rights in the accused.
253
 
There is no recourse for a prosecutor’s failure to follow the guidelines set 
out in the Policy.
254
 When prosecutors ignore the internal guidelines, courts 
                                                                                                     
 249. See id. at 180.  
 250. See White, supra note 44, at 199. 
[1] a failure to convict resulting from incompetence, corruption, intimidation or 
undue influence; 
[2] court or jury nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law; 
[3] the unavailability of significant evidence not timely discovered or known by 
the prosecution, or because it was kept from the trier of fact's consideration 
because of an erroneous interpretation of the law; 
[4] the failure in a prior state prosecution to prove an element of a state offense 
that is not an element of the contemplated federal offense; and 
[5] the exclusion of charges in a prior federal prosecution out of concern for 
fairness to other defendants, or for significant resource considerations that 
favored separate federal prosecutions.  
The presumption may also be overcome where the violation of federal law 
(1) involves a “compelling federal interest,” (2) the offense involves “egregious 
conduct,” or (3) where any prior prosecution is regarded as “manifestly 
inadequate” in light of the federal interest at issue. 
Id.  
 251. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.   
 252. See id. at 201–02. 
 253. See id. at 202. 
 254. It has been clearly established that since the Petite policy is an internal rule, 
criminal defendants may not invoke it to bar prosecution by the federal government. See, 
e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 267 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that failure to 
abide by the Petite Policy by failing to obtain approval before bringing successive federal 
charges after a state prosecution does not authorize reversal of conviction); United States v. 
Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining that failure to follow the Petite 
Policy does not create a right defendants can invoke to bar federal prosecution); United 
States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 725 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[The Petite Policy] is merely an internal 
guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review.”).; United 
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have consistently found the policy to be non-binding and unenforceable, 
thereby leaving criminal defendants without remedy.
255
   
 If the Department of Justice is to provide substantive protection to 
criminal defendants, Congress must follow the lead of the States and 
establish the underlying principles of Petite Policy as binding via 
appropriate legislation.
256
 Many states have enacted legislation that 
precludes state prosecution of a defendant for harms properly addressed in 
federal proceedings.
257
 However, even if all fifty states enacted this 
legislation, a defendant remains unprotected against a successive 
prosecution by the federal government.
258
   
The following proposals serve as guidance for unilateral action by the 
Executive and Legislative branches, while presenting justiciable claims for 
litigants to secure the Court’s protection from those constitutional 
violations presented by centralized prosecutions. Both the Petite Policy and 
its State parallels were derived from the illustration presented by the 
Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine known as the “sham 
prosecution.”  
                                                                                                     
States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) (“In any case, it is apparent that the 
Petite policy is intended to be no more than self-regulation on the part of the Department of 
Justice.”). 
 255. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e are not 
prepared to hold that a letter, press release, or similar statement of the Attorney General, 
which is not promulgated as a regulation of the Justice Department, and published in the 
Federal Registrar, can serve to invalidate an otherwise valid indictment returned by the 
Grand Jury.”); United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 294–95 (4th Cir. N.C. 2003); United 
States v. Kriens, 270 F.3d 597, 603 (8th Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Thompson, 579 
F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A] press release expressing a policy statement and not 
promulgated as a regulation of the Department of Justice and published in the Federal 
Register is simply a ‘housekeeping provision of the Department.”’). 
 256. Several jurists argue that the Petite Policy should be binding and provide 
defendants with enforceable due process protections. See United States v. Thompson, 579 
F.2d 1184, 1189–92 (10th Cir. 1978) (Seth, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the policy was 
violated and the defendant should be able to receive the benefit of being protected from 
unfairness associated with needless prosecutions) 
 257. See Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, nn. 191–92 (1986). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
303 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1984); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.64 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 609.045 
(1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN  § 2C:1-11 (West 
1982); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 40.20 (1981 & 1984-85 Supp.); OKLA. STAT.  ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 130 (West 1968); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); and WISC. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 
(West 1982). 
 258. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1884.  
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A majority of State legislatures have taken the Petite Policy one step 
further, making similar principles binding on State prosecutors in order to 
prevent successive prosecutions once State interests have been adjudicated 
in federal courts.
259
 Both of these protections are “flawed or nonexistent.”
260
 
Moreover, as current remedial schemes only address harms arising from 
successive convictions, neither the Petite Policy, nor state intervention, has 
sufficiently addressed harms arising in initial proceedings or occurring after 
an initial acquittal.  
The following proposals serve as guidance for unilateral action by the 
Executive and Legislative branches, while presenting justiciable claims for 
litigants to secure the Court’s protection from those constitutional 
violations presented by centralized prosecutions.  
V. Remedies  
A. Potential Remedies from Executive Policy 
Though the Petite Policy has served as an internal check on successive 
prosecutions by the Federal Government, the Department of Justice can 
easily address issues arising from the use of a cross-designated SAUSA. 
First, the Petite Policy should be expanded to bar all successive 
prosecutions of a defendant for harms previously litigated in State courts, 
regardless of the outcome. The current policy bars prosecution of convicted 
defendants, but fails to apply to those State prosecutions that prove 
unsuccessful. By extending the Petite Policy, the Department of Justice can 
prevent cross-designated State prosecutors from having “two bites at the 
apple.” The Policy can also be expanded to initiate Federal stays of all 
proceedings against defendants who have been simultaneously exposed to 
State proceedings. 
Simultaneous prosecutions present an array of harms independent of 
those created by successive proceedings. Whether the conduct underlying 
federal indictments is the same or wholly irrelevant to those ongoing in 
State courts, simultaneous prosecution by a cross-designated prosecutor 
                                                                                                     
 259. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 294 (“Thirteen states impose a similar limitation, 
limiting state prosecution of offenses arising out of the same conduct previously subject to 
federal prosecution.”).   
 260. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1882 (listing protections normally suggested as 
effective for safeguarding defendants’ rights in successive prosecutions).  
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threatens a defendant’s ability to negotiate or prepare a material defense.  
Strains on defendant’s resources, defendant’s counsel, and the courts are 
too substantive in this context and further no legitimate governmental 
interest. A policy barring simultaneous prosecutions will afford 
fundamentally fair defense and grant judges comfort in knowing that their 
sovereign will not lose custody of the defendant in the process.  
An expansive Petite Policy may be a substantive amendment to the 
current prosecutorial system, but the most effective Executive remedy 
comes from policies traditionally found in the private sector—the use of the 
“Chinese Firewall”. In the private setting, these “firewalls” serve as internal 
veils preventing attorneys from accessing records of, or contributing to, 
cases against parties represented by the employee in previous 
employment.
261
 The same severance of collaboration can be implemented in 
the Department of Justice, barring SAUSAs from representing States in 
criminal proceedings against the same defendant. By removing the SAUSA 
from his role on behalf of his respective State, the Department of Justice 
can implement a system preventing prosecutorial abuse of dual sovereignty. 
Though it may only be enforceable internally, the limited protection instills 
a policy that prioritizes sovereign independence. In the same way the Petite 
Policy has had influence on successive prosecution, a firewall can curtail 
centralization and put SAUSAs on notice that their appearance in federal 
proceedings will be strictly on behalf of the United States.  
State Attorneys General may be able to establish similar firewall 
policies independently of the Department of Justice. Putting cross-
designated State prosecutors on notice that appearance on behalf of the 
United States strips authorities to prosecute the defendant on behalf of the 
State can force SAUSAs to weigh State’s interests in the case while 
prioritizing their relationship with the State.  
B. Potential Remedies from Legislative Policy 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Michael Davis & Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Four Professions: 
A Comparative Analysis, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22946/ (noting that law firms have created 
methods for “screening” lawyers within firms as a way of managing conflicts of interest, 
often described as “firewalls”).  
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State legislatures have acted proactively in codifying the underlying 
principles of the Petite Policy, but Congress has yet to do so.
262
 Federal 
legislation barring simultaneous or successive prosecutions of defendants in 
State proceedings will provide judges with the authority to enforce 
procedural and substantive fairness. By implementing and expanding the 
Petite Policy via statute, Congress can provide a bevy of remedies typically 
unavailable to judges or defendants.
263
 Legislative action extends 
enforcement to injunctive relief, possible grounds for dismissing a case, or 
an outright ban of SAUSAs appearance in particular cases.  
State legislatures have already shown a willingness to implement 
policies rather than waiting for executive intervention.
264
 By expanding 
current policies to bar simultaneous prosecutions, while implementing 
mandatory “firewall” protections, States can maintain independence, 
restrict agents from sacrificing State interests, and protect against the 
unnecessary expenditure of State resources.  
C.  Potential Claims for Judicial Intervention 
Absent affirmative intervention from the Executive or Legislative 
branches, the only remedy a defendant may seek in a centralized 
prosecution is via judicial intervention. Only one case, United States v. 
Belcher, has resulted in a dismissal of a successive prosecution by a cross-
designated prosecutor on behalf of an alternate sovereign. The court limited 
the scope of the ruling by dismissing the subsequent case on collateral 
estoppel grounds, deeming the acquittal of the defendant in one case as a 
non-justiciable resolution of fact against the same party, the prosecutor. The 
unique context of the Belcher case, rather than the prosecutor’s cross-
designation, may have played a substantive role in the court’s search for an 
equitable outcome. The sovereign, rather than the individual prosecutor, is 
typically considered the litigating party in criminal proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental principles underlying the outcome justified 
the remedy in Belcher and can be found in contexts giving rise to legitimate 
                                                                                                     
 262. See Murchison, supra note 257, at 413 (collecting statutes).  
 263. In 1975, a proposal for federal legislation dealing with successive prosecutions in 
the federal system failed because it was thought that the Petite Policy adequately dealt with 
the problem. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 100, at 722. 
 264. See Murchison, supra note 257. 
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Our criminal justice system places an increasingly strong emphasis on 
crime control and prevention at the expense of the fundamental fairness that 
the Constitution affords criminal defendants. Uncontrolled discretion in the 
hands of a powerful government official has great potential for abuse. In the 
hands of cross-designated prosecutors, this potential often becomes a 
reality. Courts have been unwilling to systematically rein in the prosecutors, 
which has resulted in a decline in the fairness of the criminal justice system. 
Considering the justifications for cross-designated prosecutors—namely 
efficiency—in light of the extensive burden on the accused, one should 
question the continued propriety of this system of centralized prosecution. 
Addressing this problem and implementing measures to curtail its practice 
will afford criminal defendants protection from abuses of prosecutorial 
power and manipulation of the criminal process.  
                                                                                                     
 265. See Braun, supra note 4, at 73–74 (calling for an exception to the dual sovereignty 
doctrine where the federal and state governments cooperate at the investigative or 
prosecutorial stages of the criminal process).   
